

# ProSAVANA's Communication Strategy and its Impact: An Analysis of JICA's Disclosed and Leaked Documents

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No! to landgrab, Japan<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> No to Land Grab, Japan was formed by experts and concerned citizens engaged in global issues on food and agriculture in 2010. They sent an open letter on ProSAVANA to JICA expressing serious concerns about its impact to family farmers in Mozambique in December, 2011. Since then they have actively been engaged in the advocacy activities on ProSAVANA. <http://landgrab-japan.blogspot.de/2011/12/jica.html>

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