



Joint Statement and Open Questions on ProSAVANA by the Civil Society of Mozambique, Brazil and Japan in Response to Newly Leaked Government Documents

August 27, 2016

Background and Purpose

In October 2012, UNAC, the largest peasant movement in Mozambique, came forth with a declaration that outlined its concerns with ProSAVANA¹, a large-scale agricultural development program in the Nacala Corridor in the north of Mozambique. We, as members of civil society from the three countries involved (Mozambique, Brazil, and Japan), have since been actively engaged in seeking change in the program in a direction that respects the rights and sovereignty of local peasants.²

In May 2013, an open letter was submitted by UNAC and twenty-three local civil organizations to the governments of the three countries. The open letter requested an immediate suspension of the program, the disclosure of pertinent information, and a fundamental reconsideration of the program that would allow for the independent and active participation of peasants.³ In response, the governments promised to carry out a “careful dialogue” with peasant and civil society organizations.⁴

However, information concerning the program continues to be withheld, and since 2013, there have been continued threats and human rights violations against individuals and leaders of peasant unions that have raised reservations or are in opposition to the program. “Public hearings” were held in the 19 districts where the program would be implemented between April and June of 2015. However, over 80 civil society organizations around the world, including UNAC, have condemned the “hearings” as rigged, staged, and flawed, and denounced the process and the outcome as invalid.⁵

Following such developments, civil society in the three countries has repeatedly requested 1) respect for human rights, 2) improved transparency and accountability, and 3) valid and “Meaningful Dialogue” based on FPIC (free, prior, and informed consent). Despite verbal promises, the situation has only continued to deteriorate.

In October 2015, JICA initiated a “stakeholder engagement project,”⁶ “in order to respond to criticism directed at the public hearings, especially of UNAC.”⁷ However, the said projects were rolled out without informing civil society in the three countries, and have had negative repercussions, notably on Mozambican civil society. In February of this year, UNAC and nine local civil organizations issued a statement on ProSAVANA “denouncing the unfairness of the dialogue process.”⁸

In May of this year, 46 documents related to the ProSAVANA “civil society participation project” were leaked.⁹ Over one hundred public documents were obtained additionally under the Japanese Administrative Information Disclosure Law.

This statement strongly condemns the findings in these documents and demands that the following concerns be addressed and questions answered immediately by the three governments.

What the Documents Reveal

The evidence from these documents, findings through field research at the program site,¹⁰ and a careful assessment of explanations given by the government in various meetings,¹¹ indicate the following:

1) In December of 2012, immediately following the denunciation of the ProSAVANA program by UNAC in October, the governments of the three countries agreed to adopt a “Communications Strategy.”¹² Various countermeasures against civil society organizations and movements raising reservations or in opposition of the ProSAVANA program were planned and implemented. The scheme was financed by JICA¹³ as an “Intervention Proposal and Action Plan.”¹⁴

2) A “Network of Collaborators” including district administrators, traditional authority figures, and cooperative individuals was formed¹⁵ in order to diminish the influence of peasant and civil organizations in the local communities of 19 districts targeted by the program and to undermine their claims.¹⁶

3) In order to create division among civil society groups and to undermine the credibility of, and trust in international civil society organizations (especially those from Brazil and Japan), various measures were taken involving local government authorities and media.¹⁷

4) In October 2015, JICA initiated the “Stakeholder Engagement Project,” and through a contract with local consultants,¹⁸ implemented a strategy to “achieve buy-in from civil society.”¹⁹ Specifically, they identified potential conflicts of interest between local civil society groups or internally within groups and made strategic interventions;²⁰ “promoted the development of alliances”²¹ in support of the ProSAVANA program; pushed for the “cultivation” of certain groups;²² and aimed to create a “a (singular) dialogue platform”/“ProSAVANA advisory [working] committee.”²³ Only “those who demonstrate willingness” and approved by JICA and ProSAVANA-HQ were invited to the preparatory meetings.²⁴ The “No to ProSAVANA Campaign,” including UNAC and its provincial unions were also excluded and “disregarded in terms of negotiations.”²⁵ The creation of the platform moved forward, as they expected to create a circumstance in which groups would have no choice but to participate for fear of being left behind and isolated.²⁶

A thorough analysis of these documents, which this statement is based on, was published on August 22, 2016, by Japanese civil society.²⁷ The details can be found in that paper, but this statement concludes that it is clear that the ProSAVANA program, far from responding to the urgent concerns and demands of local peasants unions and civil society organizations that support them in the three countries, has actively strategized and sought to weaken, create division, and isolate, those raising valid concerns against the program.

Resistance, Demands, and Open Questions

We strongly condemn this intervention and manipulation of civil society by the government as part of an international cooperation program.

Land grabbing remains a pressing concern in the Nacala Corridor. The “Nacala Corridor Economic Development” program, which is the greater scheme that the ProSAVANA program falls under, continues to promote investment without effectively addressing this issue.²⁸ International cooperation and aid programs should support the empowerment and solidarity of peasants and civil society facing these challenges. However, the ProSAVANA program does the opposite, intentionally weakening and creating division among peasants. Meanwhile, there is an increased risk of even more peasants losing their land.

The current situation, as discussed above, not only goes against the principles of “international solidarity” and “international cooperation” as promoted by the governments of Brazil and Japan and their respective agencies, but also violates fundamental constitutional rights of the peoples. We strongly condemn the three governments for withholding and concealing information, in breach of relevant guidelines and laws in each of the countries, and for continuing to deliberately and institutionally implement measures as outlined above. We also stress that these counter-activities taken against civil society are taking place in the context of deteriorating peace, democracy, governance, and human rights in Mozambique.²⁹

We, as citizens of the three countries, demand the following measures be taken immediately:

1. Stop the ProSAVANA program and all related activities

2. **Disclose all remaining government documents related to ProSAVANA in order that the three governments fulfill their responsibility and accountability**

We also request that the three governments provide clear responses to the following questions:

- 1) **A response to the claims this statement makes on the “Communication Strategy”**
- 2) **A response to the claims this statement makes on the “Stakeholder Engagement Project”**

Lastly, we manifest our strong concern with the following development:

According to the leaked documents, the “counterpart fund” from food (agriculture) aid (KR/KRII) provided by Japan will be the source of funding for future “dialogue” activities.³⁰ The non-transparent nature of this “counterpart fund,” in which the beneficiary country pools funds outside of its own treasury, has been an outstanding concern. This only adds to the continued lack of transparency in the ProSAVANA program.

Conclusion

Since civil society organizations that have decided to participate in the dialogue mechanism are unaware of most of the information discussed above, we request that these organizations carefully examine the primary sources³¹ and the analysis paper³² for this information, and to then reconsider their future engagement with the ProSAVANA program.

We, the citizens of the three countries, declare our resolve to continue working with Mozambican peasants to protect their rights, dignity, sovereignty and land.

Organization Signatures

MOZAMBIQUE

1. National Union of Farmers-Mozambique (UNAC)
2. Justiça Ambiental (JA!)
3. Academic Action for Community Development (ADECRU)
4. World March of Women
5. Fórum Mulher
6. LIVANINGO
7. Mozambican League for Human Rights (LDH)
8. Friends of the Earth Mozambique
9. Comissão Diocesana de Justiça e Paz de Nacala (CDJPN)
10. Comissão de Justiça e Paz da Arquidiocese de Nampula (CaJuPaNa)
11. RISC – Mocambique
12. Associação Mocambicana para o Desenvolvimento da Comunidade e Meio Ambiente

BRAZIL

13. AV —Articulação Internacional dos Atingidos pela Vale
14. Cimi – Conselho Indigenista Missionário
15. CONTAG - Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores Rurais Agricultores e Agricultoras Familiares
16. CPT - Comissão Pastoral da Terra
17. FASE - Solidariedade e Educação
18. FETRAF - Federação Nacional dos Trabalhadores e Trabalhadoras na Agricultura Familiar
19. INESC - Instituto de Estudos Socioeconômicos
20. MAB - Movimento dos Atingidos por Barragens
21. MMC - Movimento de Mulheres Camponesas
22. MST - Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra
23. MPA - Movimento dos Pequenos Agricultores
24. PACS - Instituto Políticas Alternativas para o Cone Sul
25. Rede de Mulheres Negras para Soberania e Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional
26. Amigos da Terra Brazil

27. Fórum Brasileiro de Soberania e Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional
28. REBRIP - Rede Brasileira pela Integração dos Povos
29. ADEREMG - Articulação dos Empregados Rurais do Estado de Minas Gerais
30. SERRSMG - Sindicato dos Empregados Rurais da Região Sul de Minas Gerais
31. Sindercam - Sindicato dos Empregados Rurais de Carmo de Minas MG
32. Feraemg - Federação dos Empregados Rurais Assalariados do Estado de Minas Gerais

JAPAN

33. Japan International Volunteer Center (JVC)
34. Africa Japan Forum (AJF)
35. Concerned Citizens Group with the Mozambican Development-Japan (Mokai)
36. No! to landgrab, Japan
37. ATTAC Japan
38. Asian Farmer's Exchange Center
39. Japanese Federation of Farmer's Unions
40. Farmer's Union of Hokkaido, Japan
41. FOE Japan
42. Network between Village and Town
43. WE21 Japan
44. Japan Center for a Sustainable Environment and Society (JACSES)
45. WE21 Japan Hodogaya
46. WE21 Japan Izumi
47. WE21 Japan Fujisawa
48. Mekong Watch
49. Kinoshita Co., Ltd.
50. ODA Reform Network
51. Alternative People's Linkage in Asia (APLA)
52. Ayus
53. Advocacy and Monitoring Network on Sustainable Development (AMnet)
54. Freedom School 'YU'
55. Hokkaido NGO Network Council
56. Concerned Citizens Group with TPP
57. Action for Solidarity, Equality, Environment, and Development
58. ODA Reform Network Kansai

Supporting Organizations

1. NRAN (No REDD in Africa Network)
2. KEPA / Finland
3. Alternative Information and Development Centre (AIDC) / South Africa
4. CESTA / El Salvador
5. Centro de Documentación en Derechos Humanos "Segundo Montes Mozo S.J." (CSMM) / Ecuador
6. Plataforma Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Democracia y Desarrollo (PIDHDD Regional) / Ecuador
7. FOE Togo
8. Centre for Environment and Development/Cameroon
9. World Rainforest Movement
10. FOE Africa
11. Groundwork South Africa
12. GRAIN
13. FIAN International
14. Red Regional agua, desarrollo y democracia (REDAD) / Peru
15. ATTAC ARGENTINA / Argentina
16. Woman Health Philippines / Philippine

17. CADTM International
18. ATTAC / CADTM Maroc / Morocco
19. CADTM AYNA
20. CADTM France / France
21. CADTM Belgique / Belgium
22. The Transnational Institute (TNI)
23. Haburas Foundation / FoE Timor Leste
24. COECOCEIBA – FoE COSTA RICA
25. ATTAC France / France
26. Earth Harmony Innovators / South Africa
27. Ukuvuna Urban Farming / Zimbabwe

¹ The abbreviation for “Program for agricultural development in the African tropical savannah through triangular cooperation from Japan, Brazil, and Mozambique (September 2009 agreement).

² “No to ProSavana! Launch of national campaign” (June 2, 2014). <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/23577>
 The advocacy activities on ProSAVANA began with the first statement of UNAC released on October 11, 2012. (<http://www.farmlandgrab.org/21211>) It followed a position paper released by JA! on January 2013. https://issuu.com/justicaambiental/docs/ja_position_paper_on_the_prosavana Since then, many statements have been released by Mozambican, Brazilian, Japanese and international organizations. These are at the following site: <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/cat/show/827>

³ “Open Letter from Mozambican civil society organizations and movements to the presidents of Mozambique and Brazil and the Prime Minister of Japan (calling for the immediate suspension of ProSAVANA)” (May 28, 2013). <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/22150>

⁴ House of Councilors Settlement Committee (May 12, 2014). After JICA chairman Tanaka Akihiko and Minister Kishida Fumio promised “careful activities(process)” and “careful dialogue,” on April 20, 2015

⁵ Mozambique: People’s appeal for an immediate invalidation of the ‘Public Hearing of ProSavana’s Master Plan” (June 4, 2015) <http://farmlandgrab.org/25017>

⁶ Explained after its creation by JICA at the fifteenth dialogue meeting (February 19, 2016). The sequence of events is collected in the following document. “Voice of Japanese Civil Society: Declaration of Resistance to the ProSAVANA ‘Stakeholder Engagement Project’ and Demand for a Drastic Reevaluation” (March 18, 2016). http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/17kai_shiryo/ref3.pdf
http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/activities/ps20160318statement.html

⁷ The sixteenth dialogue meeting (March 9, 2016).

⁸ “No to ProSavana Campaign denounces irregularities in ProSavana dialogue” (February 17, 2016). <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/25797> “Summary of the No to ProSavana Campaign’s meeting for convergence and resistance” (May 7, 2016). <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/26181>

⁹ The documents are available in their entirety at the following site: <http://farmlandgrab.org/26158>

¹⁰ Since July of 2013, Japanese NGOs, along with peasant unions and civil society organizations in Mozambique, have conducted 8 joint field research. The results are as follows. “ProSAVANA Civil Society Report 2013: Findings and Recommendations” (April 2014).

<http://www.dlmarket.jp/products/detail/263029> “Observations on ProSAVANA: Outline and Changes, and Recommendations from NGOs” (October 28, 2014). <http://www.ngo-jvc.net/jp/projects/advocacy-statement/data/proposal%20final.pdf> Also see the following report from a dialogue meeting: http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/14kai_shiryo/ref3.pdf

¹¹ Since January of 2013, there have been seventeen “dialogue meeting on the ProSAVANA program” between Japanese NGOs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and JICA. The summaries a materials from the meetings are available at the following: http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shimin/oda_ngo/taiwa/prosavana/index.html

¹² The meeting record from coordination meeting of the three countries is available here: <https://www.grain.org/article/entries/4703-leaked-prosavana-master-plan-confirms-worst-fears>

¹³ In order to formulate a communication strategy JICA signed a contract with a local (Portuguese) consulting agency, CV&A, and gave this as the purpose in the project aims (ToR [Terms of Reference], page 4). http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/docs/102.pdf For the primary sources related to the “Communication Strategy” see http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/index_docs.html

¹⁴ ToR, page 4. In the “Monthly Report (Relatório de actividade ProSAVANA)” by CV&A, it became clear that CV&A had moved to enact the strategy they formulated. Only the monthly reports for July, August, and October of 2014 were disclosed by JICA.

¹⁵ “ProSAVANA Communication Strategy (Estratégia de Comunicação: ProSAVANA)” (September 2013), pages 10-12, 23-26, 46. http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/docs/104.pdf

¹⁶ “By having direct contact with these communities, it will devalue these associations representing the communities or farmers. In order to minimize the strength of these organizations are as follows:.... By taking importance away from the Mozambican civil society organizations, it will take strength away from the foreign NGOs to operate in Mozambique.” (ProSAVANA Communication Strategy) (September 2013, pages 34-35.) http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/docs/104.pdf Original in Portuguese. This “strategy,” as a public document for the ProSAVANA program, was agreed upon by the three countries and JICA, authored and released by ProSAVANA.

¹⁷ The original uses the word “devaluing.” And see the following description: “Additionally, following this communication strategy and doing away with the connection between the Nacala Corridor and the Brazilian Cerrado will help devaluate some of the principal argument points of these international NGOs” (“ProSAVANA Communication Strategy, pages 30-35. “The international media does not tend to take such offers, but ProSAVANA must always offer to support expenses” (34). These proposals are not solely from CV&A, as it is clear by the same appearing in the appended documents to its contract with JICA (ToR, “Communication Strategy in the Framework of ProSAVANA.” The latter is available here: http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/docs/103.pdf

¹⁸ JICA’s ToR to MAJOL. http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/docs/122.pdf

¹⁹ Made clear in MAJOL’s “Inception Report” (page 5) disclosed by JICA. http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/docs/123.pdf

²⁰ The original gives “identification of ...potential conflicts or conflicts of interest between the project and particular groups or between the groups themselves.”

²¹ MAJOL’s “Inception Report” disclosed by JICA” (page 18).

²² The leaked “semi-final draft” of the “ProSAVANA, Stakeholder Mapping” by MAJOL (page 20). <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/uploads/attachment/Map.2.pdf>

²³ “A dialogue platform” in JICA’s ToR (October 2015) was transformed to a “ProSAVANA advisory committee” in MAJOL’s inception report (November 2015). MAJOL suggested JICA to modify “advisory” to “working,” and remained that way until January 2016 (MAJOL’s invitation letter).

²⁴ Clearly written in JICA’s ToR (pages 2-3). http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/docs/122.pdf

²⁵ “Stakeholder mapping” (page 33) <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/uploads/attachment/Map.3.pdf>

²⁶ See page 33 of the leaked “Stakeholder Mapping.” The original gives “is small enough to be essentially disregarded in terms of negotiation...” <http://www.farmlandgrab.org/uploads/attachment/Map.3.pdf> Disclosure from JICA has been denied.

²⁷ No! to landgrab, Japan “ProSAVANA’s communication strategy and its impact: An analysis of JICA’s disclosed and leaked documents” (22 August 2016) <http://farmlandgrab.org/26449>

²⁸ The internationally-known researcher on Mozambique, Joseph Hanlon, in his article “Comment on ProSAVANA: What does a successful campaign do after it wins?” (June 26, 2016), praised the campaign as “the most successful campaign in Mozambique.” Yet he criticizes organizations for continuing to focus on campaign against land grabs in Northern Mozambique, arguing that land grabs are no longer a major threat in the area. He writes, “There appear to have been no new large agricultural land grabs in the past five years. And existing projects are not doing well.” This is not how we view the situation. The dangers of land grabbing in the area are not decreasing. For example, Hanlon dismisses a proposed 240,000 ha project along the Rio Luirió (Lurio Valley Development Project) that could displace 500,000 families as not being serious. A recent article, based in part on information from the Panama Papers database, shows however that the project remains under examination by the Mozambique government and DUATs (land title) have been applied for. There is also the involvement of a company belonging to a holding company of the Abu Dhabi Royal Family, indicating that funding is a real possibility. (<http://farmlandgrab.org/26386>). If we follow Hanlon’s claim, the peasant and civil society organizations will not be able to engage in this kind of landgrabbing “plans” and in rolling back activities for already grabbed land. Further, the area along the current Nacala corridor is also experiencing land grabbing from not only agribusiness but also afforestation plantations and infrastructure (railroads) as written in the “Nacala Corridor Economic Development.”

²⁹ See “State of Military, Government, and Society in Mozambique: Focus on the Nacala Corridor and ProSAVANA” (March 3, 2016). http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/oda/2015301.pdf

³⁰ http://www.farmlandgrab.org/uploads/attachment/doc_2.pdf

³¹ <http://farmlandgrab.org/26158> http://www.ajf.gr.jp/lang_ja/ProSAVANA/index_docs.html

³² <http://farmlandgrab.org/26449>